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Abstract 
This paper aims to explain how Italian Regional Governments reacted to the introduction of the Anti-Corruption 
Plans in order to understand the degree of thoroughness. To answer the research question 20 Anti-Corruption 
Plans prepared by Italian Regional Governments for the years 2013-2016. The plans were examined using a 
meaning-oriented content analysis. This analysis allows us to detect the degree of compliance with the National 
Anticorruption Plan (NAP). Also we investigated the characteristics of the information, as well as the degree of 
thoroughness of the reports. Our findings highlight the existence of high degree of heterogeneity in the Anti 
corruption plans that characterises the national context. Also, our findings reveal the existence of a wide 
presence of regions employing poor reporting practices. 
Keywords: accountability, corruption, anti corruption plans 
1. Introduction 
Over the last few years, the issues relating to the need for greater accountability and transparency in the public 
sector have become central, encouraging governments and organisations to re-shape their agenda. The promotion 
of accountability and transparency has led to extensive reforms, which is known as a key site for corruption 
(Hawkins, Gravier & Powley, 2011; Søreide, 2002; Rose-Ackerman, 1999). Corruption regulation is featured by 
growing demand for information to divulge among citizens. Such information should allow people to understand 
how public sector organizations prevent/face the corruption threat. However, in this context public sector bodies 
may well be willing to use disclosure to pursue formal compliance purposes, rather than putting effort in 
fulfilling accountability expectations. This represents a central worry that deserves far more attention. 
In Italy this pressures for accountability and disclosure resulted in adapting the national legal framework against 
corruption in the public sector with the promulgation in 2012 of a new law (no. 190) and in 2013 of the National 
Anti-Corruption Plan (NAP), which requires Public Administrations to publicly report the initiatives taken to 
mitigate the corruption risk. Anti-corruption plans represent disclosure vehicles that might become a means of 
truly carrying out accountability, and to engender trust between governments and stakeholders. However, there is 
also the chance that this kind of plans could be used to satisfying the compliance requirements, but without 
delivering substantially useful information for accountability reasons. On this basis, this paper aims to 
understand how Italian Regional Governments have reacted to the introduction of the Anti-Corruption Plans, that 
is to comprehend whether their information is thorough enough to ensure broader accountability, or conversely, 
satisfies only compliance duties. 
To this aim, we analyzed 20 Italian Regional Anti-corruption Plans employing a meaning oriented content 
analysis to detect the degree of compliance with the PNA and the characteristics of the information, as well as 
the degree of thoroughness of the reports.  
The paper is organized as follows. The second section addresses the issues relating to accountability and deals 
with the debate on the questions relating to corruption prevention. The fourth section describes the research 
design. The fifth section reports the main findings. The last section discusses the results and provides some 
concluding remarks. 
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2. Prior Literature 
The purpose and meaning of the expression accountability have been variously understood and applied to a 
broad range of different areas, rendering it an extremely general concept suitable to indicate any mechanisms 
that institutions can employ to provide adequate responses to the public opinion of reference (Dubnick, 1998; 
Day & Klein, 1987; Sinclair, 1995). Such general applicability has been largely criticized as the term 
accountability represents an evocative word, often used either to strengthen weak arguments and to recall images 
of reliability, loyalty and justice, or to dealing with any potential criticisms, sometimes without a real operational 
foundation. Furthermore, it is well acknowledged that none of the other European languages provide a notion of 
accountability equivalent to the Anglo-Saxon one recalled here. Consequently, there is the danger that the 
concept progressively become less useful for analytical purposes and that, conversely, it only constitutes a 
cauldron made of good intentions, loosely defined concepts, and images of good governance (Dubnick, 2002; 
Bovens, 2007). 
Bearing in mind such complexity, it is now important to examine the different definitions available to identify 
the main features of accountability. Firstly, referring to a conception that in the past found wide acceptance, 
either by academics or practitioners, accountability can be understood as the process by which a subject is called 
to “be accountable” for his actions and choices to a designated authority (Finer, 1941; Thynne & Goldring, 
1987; Caiden, 1988). On this basis, one could argue that the accountability is external, as it compels reporting 
processes directed to actors other than those that must be held accountable for their activities. Besides, it implies 
a social interaction and the existence of a right of authority by a first subject towards a second one, because who 
requires reporting is looking for answers, and who is responsible provides these information accepting feedbacks 
and possible sanctions. The relationship between citizens and elected politicians usefully exemplifies the 
conception described above, with especial reference to the mechanisms by which voters can ideally empower 
their representatives with respect to the stated policies, the decisions planned and the actions really undertaken. 
In this case accountability is identified with the concept of responsibility.  
In fact, in the U.S. context the debate around external accountability was originally characterized by full 
assimilation of this expression with that of responsibility intended as the need for external control and, in a 
second instance, as the responsibility of the individuals in terms of conscience and moral values (Finer, 1941; 
Friedrich, 1940; Harmon & Mayer 1986; Romzek & Dubnick, 1987; Dubnick 1998; March & Olsen 1995). On 
the other hand, in the UK context the coincidence between accountability and responsibility is only partial. Here 
the discussion around accountability was strictly related to the issues of ministerial responsibility in order to 
explore the problems deriving from the identification of Ministers, as the solely responsible for the whole 
conduct undertaken by their departments (Mulgan, 2000). In this respect, accountability assumes the formulation 
of responsibility, due to the size of the external control. However such a notion permits to ascribe only some 
aspects of the responsibility to the accountability. Consequently, the latter cannot completely cover the entire 
range of activities and processes which require a certain degree of responsibility. 
In addition to the conceptions of accountability addressed above, different approaches have led to an expansion 
of the boundaries of the accountability and a corresponding contraction of those of the responsibility (Marshall 
& Moodie, 1959). A first extension of accountability relates to the inclusion of an internal sense, in terms of 
individual responsibility and concern for the public interest. It goes beyond the external focus discussed so far, 
and recognizes the complementarity between the spheres of professional and personal ethics. Internal 
accountability assumes that greater confidence in independent judgment and personal morality of public officials, 
may be helpful in reducing the extent of the demand for external accountability.  
A second view has often assimilated accountability to control systems, through which democracies seek to verify 
the actions of governments. This perspective identifies accountability with the control itself, rather than 
interpreting the concept as a qualifying element of the control systems. Accountability is ensured if there is the 
availability of an institutional architecture capable of guaranteeing that those involved in the public sphere are 
adequately controlled (Mulgan, 2000). 
Moreover, accountability can be understood as responsiveness, focusing on the extent to which governments are 
able to pursue their desires or the needs of their citizens, regardless of whether they are induced to do so through 
exchange processes or authoritative supervision. The difference with the previous meaning is that in the first case 
the control assumes a coercive nature which is, however, absent in the concept in question here (Mulgan, 2000). 
Yet, the term accountability has been largely relied upon to describe the public debate between citizens and 
governments in participatory democracies, even where it is not possible to identify any authority or 
employer-employee relationship between the parties involved. Although the dimensions of control and sanction 
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do not fall within the remit of accountability, their utility is recognized, as these are regarded as elements helpful 
to ensure the conservation of the participatory dialogue between the parties (Mulgan, 2000). 
Starting from the general framework considered so far, it is now worth considering the stream of researches that 
addressed the accountability issues with a special focus on the business sphere. In this regard, the principle can 
be briefly expressed as the adoption of a clear, transparent, and linear behaviour for the use of resources, that 
allows an understanding of how these have been employed and if the conducts adopted were appropriate 
(Roberts & Scapens, 1985; Parker & Gould, 1999). A definition of accountability purely related to the business 
sphere encompasses the functions of accounting and reporting, designed to give explanations or justifications of 
the managerial actions (Patton, 1992; Hood, 1991). Clarity and transparency on objectives, measures and 
responsibilities take on a crucial role in the achievement of the purposes of accountability. The relationship of 
accountability can be intended as the obligation to rendering the account towards some form of authority which 
has delegated the performance of its duties and powers, and therefore, as a form of control leading those who 
have been delegated powers to be accountable for their conduct. In this regard, it is interesting to note that, 
despite the various nuances of each definition, it is possible to identify some common traits. In fact, it is 
generally accepted that accountability involves, in any case, the following key elements: 
 The reporting process 
 The existence of two parties, the accountor or agent, who represents and is accountable to the second 
subject, namely the accountee or principal, who is represented and to which the accountor must report. 
 The existence of a social relationship between the two subjects cited above. 
Despite this, it is worth remembering that what accountability means and how this is practically achieved, 
remains a question that is still partially unsolved. In particular, a crucial question pertains the relationships 
between the accountor and the accountee that, especially in public sector, has led to extreme emphasis only on 
the aspects related to the outcomes and the results achieved. The consequence has been the compulsive adoption 
of variously conceived systems to monitoring and evaluating the performance, often in the search for an 
irrational and obsessive “measurement culture”. Also, sets of predefined indicators were erroneously thought to 
be useful for measuring and evaluating the quality of the services delivered, and to reduce the information 
asymmetries that intrinsically characterize the relationship described in the previous paragraphs. However, it is 
important to clarify that the use of such sets is not in itself sufficient, given their limitation in offering more than 
a faint description of processes and outcomes of a complex nature.  
The danger is that reporting mainly based on indicators suffering the already mentioned limits, is likely to be 
somewhat redundant and extremely flawed, not really useful to gain a better understanding of the phenomena 
investigated and, instead, able to create confusion rather than clarity. Therefore, the recipients of information 
may find it difficult to take into account the explanations obtained, or worse, may give way to measures of 
various kinds not substantially supported, and with possible negative effects, both at the system level and for the 
individual entities (Marshall, Shekelle, Brook & Leatherman, 2000; Morris, 2005; Pollit, 2006). 
On the contrary, to achieve greater accountability, and to ensure that the aforementioned relationships between 
actors are effective towards a higher quality of the system, it is no longer possible to exclusively rely upon 
“objective” and ex post measurements/assessments. In contrast, it is necessary to configure a complete process of 
change by introducing holistic approaches, which can provide a more complete picture of the problems of the 
companies in question, and permit to take into account a plurality of dimensions. Only in this case reporting can 
be useful to satisfy the accountability demands of a broad range of stakeholders. 
The promotion of accountability and transparency has led to extensive reforms in the fight against corruption in 
public sector. The magnitude and volume of procurement activities, ambiguity regarding the market value of 
many of the items being purchased, room for political discretion that characterises a huge number of government 
actors, and interdependence among political, bureaucratic, and business players make government procurement a 
key site for corruption (Hawkins et al., 2011; Søreide, 2002; Rose-Ackerman, 1999). As a result, a number of 
governments have strongly remarked that corruption is a dysfunction of public administration that emerges in the 
presence of monopoly and discretion, and that contrasting these kinds of problems is a policy priority for the 
development of communities and to achieve accountability demands. This has fostered increasing attention 
towards the role of internal controls and monitoring practices (cf., Strombom, 1998, p. 6; Fearon, 2009, p. 1000), 
the division of duties, procurement purchasing rules, the dissemination of policy manuals, and ethical guidelines 
(Benavides, 2006, p. 471; McCampbell & Rood, 1997). Moreover, emphasis has been placed on the essential 
need to ensure compliance with control tools and regulation, both at organizational and government level (Dye & 
Stapenhurst, 1998; Siame, 2002; Gilman & Stout, 2008), in order to satisfy the ever-expanding call for greater 
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accountability in the public sphere.  
Focusing for example on the Italian setting, the recent scandals that have traumatized public opinion - the EXPO 
Milano 2015 and the corruption phenomena discovered in the city of Rome - emphasize that a primary problem 
in relation to corruption is that such behaviours represent one of the most useful tools for criminal 
entrepreneurship.  
In line with this, the current condition of the Italian setting is absolutely critical and offers the image of a country 
with a high level of corruption, both in the perception of citizens and economic operators. The Corruption 
Control Index developed by the World Bank places Italy among the last places in Europe and shows a 
consistently negative trend. The Global Corruption Barometer found that among the most corrupt institutions, 
Italians indicate the political parties (69%), the Parliament (44%), public administration (29%) and the health 
care system (24%) and that only 56% of Italians would be willing to report cases of corruption. Moreover, 
corruption phenomena are facilitated in Italy by factors such as institutional decentralization, established 
practices by governments to require the provision of certain services to third parties (individuals, cooperatives, 
corporations, etc.), the constant use of derogatory systems, especially in the field of public procurement, and the 
persistence of processes for the allocation of public office-based mechanisms for the appointment, instead of 
comparative evaluations. 
For this reasons, it is now widely accepted that an effective fight against corruption, aimed at limiting the 
potential support that this provides to criminal organizations, is a priority for Italy. It requires an integrated 
policy aimed at strengthening repressive remedies, and simultaneously introducing prevention tools. Notably, a 
common feature of the upcoming regulation to prevent corruption worldwide is the demand for reports 
disclosing mandatory information on the strategies and tools employed to prevent and detect the risk of 
corruption. In Italy the evolution of the legal provisions relating to corruption in 2012 requires that institutions 
adopt a preventive and innovative approach, not limited to the aspect of criminal repression (contemplated 
through the introduction of new hypotheses of crime as the “illicit traffic of influences” and the “corruption 
between privates”), but mainly aimed at reorganizing the government in terms of prevention and transparency. 
More specifically, the new regulation resulted in adapting the national legal framework against corruption in the 
public sector with the promulgation in 2012 of a new law (no. 190), and in 2013 of the National Anti-Corruption 
Plan (NAP), which requires Public Administrations to publicly report the initiatives taken to mitigate the 
corruption risk. Anti-Corruption Plans are disclosure vehicles potentially able to convey broader accountability, 
and to engender trust between governments and stakeholders. However, there is also the chance that this kind of 
plans could be used to maintain or to recover legitimacy, by satisfying the compliance requirements, but without 
delivering substantially useful information. 
Indeed, despite the positive judgment for the initiatives undertaken to date, it is widely acknowledged that 
several doubts still remain as to whether the reports provided by Regions are truly capable to satisfy the 
information needs that led to their adoption as well as to achieve legitimacy purposes. Indeed, from an 
accountability perspective the danger is that Anti-Corruption reports may suffer limits, being somewhat 
redundant and extremely flawed, not really useful to gain a better understanding of the phenomena investigated 
and, instead, able to create confusion rather than clarity. Therefore, the recipients of information may find it 
difficult to take into account the explanations or may undertake wrong actions (Marshall et al., 2000; Morris et 
al., 2005; Pollit, 2006). On the contrary, an essential element to ensure the usefulness of the reports towards a 
greater accountability, that also the regulation has largely highlighted, is that the preventive action which is 
reported about profoundly permeates the organization and is based on a number of well coordinated tools and 
processes. Consequently, this study aims to understand whether Italian Regional Governments have provided 
only formal information in their Anti-Corruption Plans or whether they have divulged a disclosure substantially 
in line with the above-mentioned information and accountability needs.  
3. Research Design 
To answer the research question 20 Anti-Corruption Plans prepared by Italian Regional Governments for the 
years 2013-2016. The plans were examined using a meaning-oriented content analysis, a method that has 
traditionally been applied to the analysis of archive data, focusing on inferring the underlying meanings present 
in the texts being investigated (Smith & Taffler, 2000). The potential contribution of content analysis is that it 
can enable researchers to go beyond the text as presented to make valid inferences about hidden or underlying 
(and possibly unintended meanings) and messages of interest (Weber, 1990). In the social sciences, where 
meanings and interpretations are central to the understanding of social phenomena, content analysis has been 
lauded as potentially one of the most important research techniques (Krippendorf, 2004). Content analysis is 
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useful to examine the data and facts measured through an underlying framework, and distinguish them from 
background noise.  
It is important to underline that some criticisms have been raised against this method. First of all, it is considered 
subjective, thus a validation procedure is widely accepted as being necessary. To increase confidence in the 
coding, a team of three people was involved in the activity. A test of inter-rater reliability was used to check for 
consistency in coding (Milne & Adler, 1999). The data reported in this paper are based on coding performed by 
three independent researchers. Following discussion and interpretation of the framework, a coding system was 
developed after reading an initial sample of 3 Plans. The robustness of the approach used was tested through a 
measurement of the response-matching level of the codification made on the same documents. Both the Π Scott’s 
index and the Bhapkar’s test confirmed the goodness of the coding and on this basis it is possible to conclude 
that the codification made by the three researchers is concordant. 
The analysis allowed us to understand the degree of thoroughness of the information provided in relation to the 
items required by the National Anti-Corruption Plan. Then, it was possible to elaborate a score ranging between 
0 (no information) and 3 (thorough information) for each items. Subsequently, for each Plan we calculated the 
total degree of thoroughness of the plan (by summing the scores obtained for each disclosure item), ranging 
between 0 and 36. This values were then normalized to obtain an index ranging between 0 and 1. 
4. Findings 
 
Table 1. Thoroughness of information for each disclosure item 
 
 
The results (see table 1) reveal that the identification of the subjects involved, both internal and external, of their 
tasks, and their responsibilities, as well as training issues, are highly regarded only by the 30% of the regions, 
while the majority do not put much effort in providing thorough information on this regard. With reference to 
communication channels and practices to share the content of the plans, the majority of the regions devote scarce 
attention to communicate how these processes are designed and implemented. Looking at the disclosure items 
concerning risk assessment, risk identification, and prevention measures, thoroughness increases but only to a 
limited extent. On the contrary, Italian regions appear to neglect in their reports all the issues relating to the 
monitoring processes and to the coordination with the performance. 
Moreover, the following table (table 2) allows us to understand the degree of thoroughness of the information 
provided by each Region. The findings highlight two main issues. First, it is possible to recognize high 
heterogeneity that characterises the national context. Second, there is a wide presence of regions employing poor 
reporting practices. 
disclosure items
thourough average limited absent
subjects, tasks and responsibilities 30% 30% 40% 0% 100%
internal actors, participation tools, communication 10% 25% 65% 0% 100%
external actors, participation tools, communication 5% 15% 60% 20% 100%
channales and tools to share and communicate the plan 10% 20% 60% 10% 100%
training plan, training responsibles, trained subjects,training issues
communication
30% 35% 35% 0% 100%
risk identification and risk assessment 40% 35% 25% 0% 100%
risk assessment methods 35% 30% 35% 0% 100%
prevention measures timing, subjects, tasks and responsibilities 35% 35% 30% 0% 100%
effectiveness assessment and monitoring 20% 25% 50% 5% 100%
coordination with performance 0% 5% 50% 45% 100%
control tools developed 5% 15% 50% 30% 100%
monitoring process 10% 20% 40% 30% 100%
values
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Table 2. Total degree of thoroughness for each Region 
 
5. Discussion and Conclusions  
This paper moved from the awareness that the issues relating to the need for greater accountability in the public 
sector have become central, especially with reference to the extensive reforms aimed at fighting corruption. 
Hence, we focused on the upcoming demand for reports disclosing mandatory information on the strategies and 
tools employed to prevent and detect the risk of corruption. Anti-corruption plans represent disclosure vehicles 
that might become a means of truly carrying out accountability, and to engender trust between governments and 
stakeholders. However, there is also the chance that this kind of plans could be used to maintain or to recover 
legitimacy, by satisfying the compliance requirements, but without delivering substantially useful information. 
On this basis, the aim of the study was to understand whether Italian Regional Governments have provided only 
formal information in their Anti-Corruption Plans or whether they have divulged a disclosure substantially in line 
with the above-mentioned information and accountability needs, by examining the degree of thoroughness of the 
information provided in compliance with PNA requirements. 
The 20 Italian Regional Anti-corruption Plans were analyzed by employing a meaning oriented content analysis 
to detect the degree of compliance with the PNA, the characteristics of the information, and the degree of 
thoroughness of the reports. Then, a cluster analysis was carried out to understand if there are any similarities 
between the Regions and what are the factors that possibly influence any differences.  
The results highlight interesting issues that deserve further explanations. A first feature concerns disclosure items. 
The already cited high heterogeneity within the national context is even more problematic if we consider that the 
thoroughness of the information on the whole prevention process is generally scarce. Indeed, only in a few cases 
the disclosure items listed in table 1 receive the necessary attention. On the contrary, a compartmentalized 
approach to disclosure is evident in the majority of the regions, for which it is highly challenging to catch a 
general picture of the phenomena observed. In particular, the neglected issues relating to monitoring and 
coordination represent a red flag of attempts to reach formal compliance rather than a substantial effort to 
achieve greater accountability. The current state of the art indicates that the new regulations have only partially 
realized the expectations for broader transparency and accountability. Stakeholders only in limited cases can gain 
through the Plans the necessary information to reach full understanding of the problems of corruption affecting 
Italian Regions and of the measures realized to prevent it.  
The different reactions of the regions may be largely attributable to the characteristics of Regional governance 
(Caldarelli, Fiondella, Maffei, Spanò & Aria, 2013) and the full comprehension of the new regulation. In fact, in 
line with the findings of Dunphy & Doug (1988), evolutionary change was certainly favored where the Regions 
have benefited from an already favorable background in terms of the management resources available, and have 
been characterized by collaborative approaches and the presence of shared values between individuals, as well as 
Region
abruzzo
basilicata
calabria
campania
emilia romagna
friuli
lazio
liguria
lombardia
marche
molise
piemonte
puglia
sardegna
sicilia
toscana
trentino alto adige
umbria
valle d'aosta
veneto
total degree of thoroughness (considering all
the disclosure items)  
20
12
12
16
28
26
18
14
26
20
26
21
12
14
10
9
9
22
18
29
normalized index
0,56
0,33
0,33
0,44
0,78
0,72
0,50
0,39
0,72
0,56
0,72
0,58
0,33
0,39
0,28
0,25
0,25
0,61
0,50
0,81
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in the presence of propensity towards such collaborative approaches. The availability or lack of these features 
can respectively lead to high-quality corruption prevention and proactive and participatory regional governance, 
or on the other hand, to a Region based on an authoritarian model and with considerably lower levels of quality 
of the services for citizens. 
It is also worth noting that although this study reveals growing attention by the Regions to the improvement of 
the corruption prevention systems, and thus towards the development of a culture of control, it also highlights 
that the guidelines for the conduct of management action and the parameters of the evaluation processes are very 
heterogeneous. Such heterogeneity, together with the political influence allowed by law, does not allow full 
comparability between different Regions. It is therefore reasonable to assume that a risk of misalignment 
between the different Regions might exist. In fact, the Regions reluctant to changes, could strive to maintain a 
state of inertia, rather than converging gradually towards the more advanced model of the other ones. 
This research provides an interesting overview of the degree of implementation, at the Regional level, of the 
policies promoted by the on-going reforms. In particular, the results are helpful in recognizing which regions are 
‘lagging behind’, in order to develop the most appropriate intervention measures at central level. In the light of 
the foregoing, it may be worthwhile promoting, at central level, the adoption of ex ante measures to ensure the 
proper, formalized and shared implementation of corruption prevention systems in each Region, in addition to 
the ex post control operated by the Anticorruption National Authority. Yet, the results of the analysis shed light 
on the type of change that regulation has fostered over the last 10 years, especially focusing on the capability of 
Regulators to guide Regions towards the provision of more useful disclosure through the introduction of new and 
increasingly detailed legal requirements. The findings allowed us to detect the existence of any limitations of the 
complex system of corruption prevention disclosure regulation, and provide a basis for some critical thoughts 
emphasizing that the weaknesses of corruption prevention disclosure do not represent a question of compliance 
but might reflect the inefficiencies of regulation per se. 
Finally, it is useful to recall that this research could suffer some limitations relating to the choice of focusing only 
on the Regional Anticorruption Plans, rather than considering also other operational documents. The choice is 
driven by the desire to analyze, in a preliminary stage, the Regional dimension and the reaction of the Regions to 
regulatory and institutional pressures, rather than the process in itself, and its implications. In fact, in our opinion, 
the latter theme is very important, and deserves more attention so as to observe the evolution of the prevention 
systems over time, by concentrating on one Region. However, in this sense, these early results may be a good 
guideline precisely because of the choice of one region to be analyzed from this new perspective.  
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